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The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined 
with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a 
comparative advantage in political rent-seeking.  This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing 
system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of 
trust combine to stymie growth.   
 3 
INTRODUCTION 
Many decades of development economics have not eroded the large differences in the per 
capita incomes of different countries.  Indeed, by some measured, the divide between richest 
nations and the rest has broadened.  We argue that a failure to appreciate the self-reinforcing 
nature of the forces that prevent economic growth lies at the root of this failure.   
The widely held firms that characterize big business in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and (to a lesser extent) other common law developed economies, are known to be 
subject to a variety of agency problems.
1  Despite such agency problems, these economies have 
achieved and sustained high levels of economic and social development.  In contrast, as La Porta 
et al. (1999) show, widely held firms are the rarest of curiosities in most countries.   
Consequently, economists turned their attention elsewhere than ownership structure for factors 
that retard economic development outside these few countries.    
Many economists now concur with Krueger (1974) that official corruption is a critical 
barrier to growth in many countries.  Murphy et al. (1991) argue that official corruption diverts 
resources and talent away from real investments into political rent-seeking: lobbying politicians, 
influencing judges, and currying favor with bureaucrats.
2  Lucrative returns from these rent-
seeking investments ‘crowd out’ real investment in physical assets, research, and the like, which 
pay only normal returns. As political rent-seeking is a negative sum game, this investment does 
not stimulate growth.  Indeed, Murphy et al. (1993) argue that the magnitude of this diversion is 
so large in many countries that it starves real investments, especially investment in innovation, of 
                                                 
1 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the essential theory, and Morck et al.(1988, 1989, 1990) and others for 
empirical evidence on the importance of agency problems and on the mechanisms whereby they are constrained.   
2 We follow standard practice from the economics and finance literatures in using the term political rent seeking to 
describe self-interested dealings between the political and business elites.  The term rent is appropriate in its 
economic usage, which includes unearned income of any kind.  Also, we use the term corrupt, rather than illegal, to 
describe these transactions and the parties to them.  This is because political rent seeking is legal, if not socially 
acceptable behavior, in many countries.   4 
financing.  Since Schumpeter (1934), Solow (1957), and Romer (1986) are now widely accepted 
as correct in arguing that investment in innovation is critical to growth, Krueger (1974), Murphy 
et al. (1991, 1993), and others argue that this diversion seriously impedes growth.   
Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), and others hold that an absence of general trust 
in an economy prevents large, professionally managed businesses from developing, and that this 
also impedes growth for two reasons.  First, a lack of trust for outsiders causes family firms to 
avoid hiring professional managers and to shun growth if this requires external capital.  Second, 
a lack of trust for insiders causes public investors to be wary of entrusting their savings to stocks.  
Consistent with this, we find that the largest firms in poorer countries are more frequently family 
controlled.   
However, we argue that the interconnections between corruption, low trust, and poverty 
are more subtle than this, and do involve the nature of corporate ownership – but in a previously 
unexpected way.  In particular, we argue that an absence of general trust, official corruption, and 
family control of large corporations are mutually reinforcing factors that combine to block 
growth. Note that this argument applies primarily to very large family-controlled firms, not to the 
small and medium sized operations that are the typical subjects of research into family firms. 
We present empirical evidence consistent with the view that very large family firms are 
especially good at political rent seeking in many poorer economies.  We argue that this makes 
sense because rent-seeking is essentially a cooperative outcome to a prisoner’s dilemma game 
between a mercantile elite and a political elite.  Cooperative outcomes to such games are more 
likely if the number of participants is smaller, their time horizons longer, their ability to make 
credible private commitments more sure, their ability to punish a breach of faith more certain, 
and their contacts with each other more widespread.  The small number of large family corporate 5 
groups in many countries, their long continuity of control, their ability to act discretely, their 
widespread existing power, and their multiple contacts with governments give these 
organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking.   
This view of why poor nations remain poor has two implications.   
First, it explains the inability of many countries to overcome pervasive corruption and 
oligarchic corporate control.  Ending corruption is a hopeless task if a small number of leading 
families continue to control most business interests and have a comparative advantage in 
political rent-seeking.  Likewise, dislodging established oligarchic families, as sometimes 
happens after abrupt shifts of political regime, only makes space for a new oligarchy unless the 
corruption that encourages rent-seeking is discouraged.  Moreover, pervasive corporate control 
by a corrupt oligarchy is likely to reinforce public distrust of the financial system, which 
prevents professionally managed widely held firms from emerging.  We argue that a 
simultaneous attack on all three pillars of this status quo, and on the institutional arrangements 
that arise out of their interactions, is required.  Pressure to end official corruption should be 
accompanied by pressure to replace entrenched family firms with professionally managed ones 
and by aid and educational policies designed to inculcate both trust and the trustworthy behavior 
necessary to make trust worthwhile.   
Second, our results are about statistical averages.  Every very large family-controlled firm 
or group of firms is probably not primarily engaged in political rent-seeking.  Some entrenched 
oligarchic mercantile families might be enlightened and benevolent.  Moreover, professional 
management leads to a well-known set of agency problems that can also impede growth.  Further 
work is needed to clarify how these tradeoffs between the problems of entrenched family 
oligarchic control and professional management differ in different circumstances.   6 
 
FAMILY CONTROL OVER LARGE FIRMS AND ECONOMY PERFORMANCE 
The incidence of family control over very large corporations varies widely across 
countries.  Table 1 shows the fractions of the top twenty publicly traded firms, ranked by market 
capitalization, in each country that are controlled by families, as reported by La Porta et al. 
(1999).  As a robustness check, family control is defined in two ways:  first as a twenty percent 
voting block, and then as a ten percent voting block.  Note that a 51% voting block is not 
normally required for control because most small shareholders do not participate in shareholder 
meetings.   
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Family control is least important in the United Kingdom, where no family controls more 
than twenty percent of the votes of any of the top twenty public firms.  In Mexico, all of the top 
firms are family controlled by this definition Other countries range between these extremes, with 
Italy having 15% of its top twenty firms controlled by families, Belgium having 50% family 
control, and Sweden having 45% family control.  Using a ten-percent threshold, rather than 
twenty percent, gives a broadly similar distribution.   
The top twenty firms in the United States are larger than the top twenty firms in 
Singapore.  It therefore makes sense to look at a second sample of roughly similar sized firms 
from each country.  Table 1 therefore also shows the incidence of family control in each country 
for ten middle sized firms, defined here as having market capitalizations greater than US$500 
million.  Again, there is substantial variation between countries, and the rankings of countries 
change somewhat.  Most notably, Germany and Italy exhibit a much higher incidence of family 
control in medium-sized firms than in their largest firms.   7 
Note that what we call medium sized firms are still quite large by any standards.  Table 1 
does not include information about small private family firms. All of our family control 
measures gauge the important of the great mercantile families of each country.  Consequently, 
we interpret these variables as measuring oligarchic family control, as opposed to merely family 
control.   
  Although our sample of countries contains no extremely poor countries, it contains most 
of the major rich and middle-income countries in the world.  The first thing one is apt to notice 
about Table 1 is a general tendency for higher income countries to exhibit a lower incidence of 
oligarchic family control.  Table 2 verifies this by displaying the simple statistical correlations of 
the oligarchic family control incidence measures in Table 1 with some standard measures of 
economic and social development, including per capita income.   
  Table 2 shows that per capita income, represented by the logarithm of each country’s 
1995 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is highly significantly negatively correlated with 
all four measures of oligarchic family control.  The poorer the country, the more important are 
great family firms.   
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Although  per capita income is a widely-used measure of a country’s level of 
development, it does not capture every dimension of development. By looking at a broader range 
of development measures, we can perhaps learn more about the economics underlying the low-
income levels in countries with high degrees of oligarchic family control.  Table 2 therefore also 
presents the simple correlations of oligarchic family control with measures of social structure 
and of the provision of public goods, including physical infrastructure, health, equality, 
education, and good government.   8 
To gauge the development of a country’s physical infrastructure, we use an average of 
five scores, one for each of roads, air, ports, telecommunications, and the electric power system, 
provided by the Global Competitiveness Report for 1996.  These scores are from surveys asking 
businesses about the extent to which each aspect of these aspects of the country’s infrastructure 
meets the needs of business.  Higher scores signify more adequate infrastructure.  All four 
measures of the incidence of oligarchic family control are highly significantly negatively 
correlated with physical infrastructure quality.  The less adequate the country’s physical 
infrastructure, the more important are great family firms.   
 Both  per capita income and physical infrastructure are measures of economic 
development.  However, other yardsticks than economic ones can gauge development.  In 
particular, a wide variety of measures of social development can be used.   
  Table 2 therefore correlates oligarchic family control with two widely used measures of 
social development – infant mortality and economic inequality.  We obtain infant mortality from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  The logarithm of the 1993 infant 
mortality rate per thousand live births is highly positively correlated with oligarchic family 
control.  Social inequality is measured by a gini coefficient.  To construct a gini coefficient, one 
graphs the country’s income distribution, as in Figure 1, and then measures the area between that 
curve and a perfect equality distribution, which is represented by a 45
0 line. Our gini coefficient 
measures are obtained from the World Bank. The further a country’s income distribution 
deviates from perfect equality, the higher is its gini coefficient.  Table 2 shows that oligarchic 
family control is highly statistically correlated with both higher infant mortality and greater 
income inequality.   
Insert Figure 1 About Here 9 
  The quality of a country’s education system is yet another dimension of development.  
Table 2 correlates oligarchic family control with the percent of respondents in a survey, 
summarized in the provided by the Global Competitiveness Report for 1996, who agreed that 
“the education system meets the needs of a competitive economy”. This measure of the quality 
of education is highly negatively correlated with the incidence of corporate control by great 
families.   
  Finally, as a general measure of the quality of government, we compare average monthly 
inflation rates from 1990 to 2002.  These data are from the World Bank. While high inflation due 
to wars or crises of various sorts, such factors are not paramount in the 1990s for the countries 
we study.  As a first approximation, we can interpret a chronic high inflation rate is a sign of 
inconsistent or irresponsible government.  Countries with higher incidences of oligarchic family 
corporate control also have consistently higher inflation.   
To summarize, countries in which more firms are controlled by great mercantile families 
are more backward in a number of dimensions.  They are poorer and less egalitarian.  They 
provide worse public goods - including worse infrastructure, worse infant mortality, worse 
education, and more irresponsible macroeconomic policies.   
 
WHY ARE FAMILY CONTROLLED ECONOMIES BACKWARD? 
  Table 2 illustrates a correlation, but is silent as to what causes what.  Some latent factor 
might induce both oligarchic family control and backwardness in certain countries.  Or, 
backwardness might create conditions where oligarchic family control makes economic sense.  
Or, might a high incidence of oligarchic family control of corporations actually cause economies 
to be backward?   10 
All of these views probably have some validity, and none of the authors cited in this 
section would insist on a single direction of causality.  Social and economic phenomena on this 
scale seldom have simple patterns of cause and effect, and complicated interactions are to be 
expected.  However, some simple observations and deductions are possible.   
An Absence of Trust? 
Much recent work proposes a candidate for a latent factor explaining both family control 
and development - “trust”, or ethical norms.  Students of the Italian economy have long noted a 
correlation between the economic and social importance of families in southern Italy and that 
region’s backward economic and social situation.  Most famously, Banfield (1958) argues that 
southern Italy is ruled by an ethical system of amoral familism.  Under this ethical system, 
keeping faith with one’s blood kin and long time friends is highly valued, but failing to keep 
faith with others, especially strangers, is regarded as inevitable.  Banfield (p. 116) writes, 
“Towards those who are not of the family, the reasonable attitude is suspicion.  The parent 
knows that other families will envy and fear the success of his family and that they are likely to 
seek to do it injury.  He must therefore fear them and be ready to do them injury in order that 
they may have less power to injure him and his.”  
Putnam (1993) provides empirical evidence supporting Banfield’s thesis.  Using surveys, 
Putnam found that southern Italians express a much lower degree of trust in the law-abiding 
nature of others than do northern Italians.  He also found a much lower degree of non-family 
interaction in southern Italy, with virtually no one participating in clubs, community 
associations, professional associations, political parties and the like, and argues that this is a 
manifestation of a low general level of trust for non-kin.  In the more prosperous northern 
regions of Italy, such memberships are common. Putnam defines social capital as a general trust 11 
in the good faith of fellow citizens, and argues that southern Italy’s backwardness is due to a 
dearth of social capital.  This is because its ethical system encourages pervasive cheating and ill-
faith, which undermines the economy.  It also leaves family firms as the only viable economic 
structures.   
Fukuyama (1995) broadens this reasoning, arguing that amoral familism is in fact 
pervasive in the traditional cultures of most countries in the world, including China, Latin 
America, Southern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.  He argues that only a few regions - 
northwestern Europe, North America, and Japan - have achieved ethical systems where people 
have a high degree of trust for strangers in day-to-day business and other interactions.   
Fukuyama suggests that these ethical norms greatly reduce the cost of economic activity and 
thereby create a general prosperity.  They also allow the most talented to take charge of the 
country’s economic and political life, and consequently allow both professionally run large 
corporations and stable democracy.   
This view is consistent with Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002) and 
Khanna (2002), who present evidence that certain great family controlled corporate groups 
prosper in Chile and India.  They argue that this is because these groups circumvent markets 
made dysfunctional by low trust.  Firms controlled by the same family can trade with each other, 
hire from each other, and finance each other without having to rely on India’s goods, labor, or 
capital markets.   
However, our data seem inconsistent with this view as a general explanation for our 
results on oligarchic family control.  If family control is related to backwardness because both 
are associated with low levels of trust, our oligarchic family control variables should be closely 
correlated with measures of the degree of trust prevalent in each country.  Table 3 therefore 12 
correlates each incidence of family corporate control variable with several survey measures of 
the level of trust people have in strangers and in family.  These measures are from La Porta et al. 
(1997), who argue that they capture key aspects of social capital. Table 3 shows all of these 
measures of social capital to be uncorrelated with oligarchic family control.   
Insert Table 3 About Here 
These results suggest that, although low trust may well be an important factor in 
explaining backwardness, it is poorly correlated across countries with family control over great 
corporations.  The relationship between oligarchic family control and backwardness must 
therefore operate through some other mechanism.   
Moreover, the view that a society’s ethical norms are entirely exogenous, and that they 
determine the level of social and economic development can achieve is disputed per se.  Fisman 
and Khanna (1999) explore changing ethical norms, and argue that increasing in the ease of two-
way communications, particularly in urbanized economies, causes increased trust in strangers.  
Locke (2002) shows that local pockets of high trust exist in archetypical low-trust regions like 
southern Italy and northeastern Brazil.  He argues that the existence of these pockets contradicts 
the thesis that certain cultural milieus cannot sustain prosperity.  But, perhaps most 
fundamentally, ethical systems are the essence of culture.  The idea that some cultures are 
incapable of sustaining prosperity, let alone democracy, has deeply pessimistic implications.  For 
it means that large fractions of the world’s population are doomed to poverty and tyranny by 
their prized traditional cultures and deeply felt ethical systems.   
Of course, establishing that ‘trust’ is not a latent factor explaining the correlation between 
oligarchic family control and backwardness does not prove that no such latent factor exists.  
Moreover, the problem with enumerating latent factors and testing each in this way is that 13 
genuine latent factors must be truly exogenous.  They must be historical residues that are not the 
results of current decisions being made in the contemporary economy.  Fukuyama (1995) makes 
a sustained case for the ambient level of trust for strangers in a country being such a factor.  La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that a country’s legal system is such a factor, however the variables they 
use to distinguish legal systems do not explain Table 2 either.
3  It is certainly possible that some 
other latent factor might explain Table 2, but we feel that exploring other patterns of causation 
makes more sense than an exhaustive search for increasingly problematic latent factors.   
 
Family Control as an Eroding Historical Residue? 
A second possibility is that more advanced countries might have a lower incidence of 
family control because their industrial economies are older.  Thus, the high incidence of great 
family control in Mexico could be due to its being in an early stage of industrialization, while the 
low incidence of family control in Britain could be due to its having been the first nation to 
industrialize.  Perhaps, as time goes by, squabbling Mexican heirs will slowly sell out to public 
shareholders, and oligarchic family control will fade. If the probability that a family sells out in 
any given year is π, with 0 < π < 1, then the probability that the family will sell out at some point 
during an n year long interval is 1 – (1 - π)
n. Obviously, as the length of the time interval, n, 
grows large, the probability that the family sells out becomes arbitrarily close to one.
4  If 
different countries were at different stages of industrial development, and incidentally had 
different levels of residual family control, we would observe the correlations in Table 2.   
                                                 
3 Stronger laws protecting public investors from abuse by controlling shareholders, corporate insiders, or capricious 
officials are correlated with lower levels of family control, however these laws cannot be regarded as exogenously 
ordained.  They might be, for example, reflect the relative lobbying power of different sorts of investors.   
4 This result is called the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, and is a fundamental building block of probability theory.  It states 
that if an event has a non-zero probability of occurring at any given time, then the probability that it will occur 
eventually over an arbitrarily long period of time is 100%.   14 
While our data provide some support for this view, it does not seem to fully explain the 
correlations in Table 2.  In Table 4, we run ordinary least squares regressions of the form 
ε β β β + + + = f y p 2 1 0  
where p is one of the economy characteristics from Table 2, y is the logarithm of 1995 per capita  
GDP, f is a measure of family control, and ε is an error term.  If family control is merely 
proxying for level of development, including y as a control should render the coefficient of the 
family ownership variable, β2, insignificant.  Table 4 presents these regressions for all 
permutations of economy characteristics and family ownership variables from Table 2.   
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Although the level of significance falls for many of the variables, most of the results in 
Table 2 remain statistically significant.  Infant mortality, income inequality, and inflation remain 
highly significantly correlated with the incidence of great family control.  Perhaps more 
importantly, growth in per capita income remains highly correlated with oligarchic family 
control after taking into account each country’s initial income level.  Since we cannot include per 
capita GDP as a dependent variable (it is the control variable), we regress real growth in per 
capita GDP from 1990 to 2000 on the logarithm of 1995 per capita GDP and family control.  
Oligarchic family control is uniformly statistically significant.  This means that countries with 
the same 1995 per capita income grow at rates negatively correlated with their incidence of 
family control.  In short, controlling for per capita income does not cause the incidence of 
oligarchic family control to lose all its explanatory power.   
Furthermore, the extreme view that development simply proceeds at an exogenous pace 
cannot explain why different countries develop at different rates, and why the incidence of 
family ownership should track these rates.  France, which began industrialization long before 15 
Germany or Japan, preserves a higher incidence of family control.  Nor can it explain why an 
industrial tyro like the Republic of Ireland has very little family control.  Some countries 
developed faster than others, and those countries also abandoned control by great mercantile 
families faster.  If all that mattered were the number of years since the beginning of 
industrialization during which heirs to great family fortunes might sell out, oligarchic family 
control would be highest in Ireland, intermediate in Germany and Japan, and almost as low in 
France as in Britain.  This is not observed.   
 
Family Control as an Impediment to Growth? 
These empirical results and logical deductions lead us consider the possibility that a high 
incidence of family control over a country’s great corporations per se might retard development.  
We in no way argue that Banfield (1958), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), and others are 
mistaken in stressing the importance of a society’s ethical norms. Nor do we object to the 
argument that, given a longer time period in which to do it, founding families are more likely to 
sell out.  Rather, we argue that an additional mechanism is likely also at work.   
The view that oligarchic family control causes poor economic performance is not new.  
For example, Landes (1949) argues that the generally poor performance of the French economy 
compared to those of Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, throughout the nineteenth 
century was caused by the predominance of family firms in France.  He argues that French 
family firms of the period were typically more interested in survival and independence than in 
growth and innovation.  This made them reluctant both to go public and to undertake high-risk 
ventures.  According to Landes, this profound conservatism retarded the performance of the 
overall economy because family businesses lobbied for protectionism and bailouts, and regarded 16 
the state as “a sort of father in whose arms [they] could always find shelter and consolation” 
(p. 50).   
We propose that this sort of behavior is typical in economies in which great mercantile 
families exercise widespread corporate control, and that this, in addition to the other explanations 
discussed above, accounts for the correlations in Table 2 and the regression coefficients in Table 
4.   
This proposition requires considerable explanation, and this is the purpose of the next two 
sections.  
 
Robustness 
The statistical results in Tables 2 through 4 are robust to sensible changes in the 
variables.   
For example, using gross national product throughout rather than gross domestic product 
generates qualitatively similar results.  By this we mean that the signs and patterns of statistical 
significance in the tables are preserved, though the precise values of the correlation and 
regression coefficients may differ somewhat. Qualitatively similar results also ensue from 
replicating Table 4 using GDP growth from 1970 to the present, and using 1970 per capita GDP 
as the control variable.  Using inflation from 1970 also generates qualitatively similar results - 
though the regression coefficients in Table 4 are of a starkly different magnitude, their signs and 
statistical significance are consonant with those show in the tables.   
Using various other measures of economic development, physical infrastructure, health 
care standards, human development, macroeconomic policy, and income equality also generate 
qualitatively similar results to those shown.  For example, an alternative measure of the quality 17 
of a country’s physical infrastructure, an assessment of “the facilities for and ease of” 
communications and transportation within the country.  This measure, provided by Business 
Environment Risk Index Corp., generates qualitatively similar results to those shown, though 
with lower significance levels in the regressions.  Using the fraction of males aged 25 and over 
who completed high school as an alternative measure of the quality of the education system 
yields also yields qualitatively similar results.  It might be argued that the variation in a country’s 
inflation rate is a better indicator of irresponsible government that the mean inflation rate.  The 
standard deviation of a country’s inflation rate is also highly significantly positively correlated 
with oligarchic family control – both in terms of simple correlations and in regressions analogous 
to Table 4.   
  Our sample of countries does not contain any very poor countries.  Corporate ownership 
figures for very poor countries are not generally available on a consistent basis.  However, 
studies or particular poor countries or regions by Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2002), 
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002), Khanna (2002), and others reveal corporate 
control predominantly in the hands of a few very wealthy families.  Consequently, including 
these countries would most likely not change our basic results.   
 
FAMILY CONTROL AND THE DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH 
Krueger (1974) argues that the largest barrier to economic growth is political rent-
seeking, or corruption.  If investing a million dollars in research and development yields a 
$50,000 per year perpetual profit, the R&D has a 5% return.  If investing the same million 
dollars in a bribe to a politician change a law changed or provide a subsidy that increases profits 
by $100,000 per year in perpetuity, this political rent-seeking investment has a 10% return.   18 
Krueger’s essential point is that, if the rents the firm can reap from bribing corrupt politicians 
exceed the profits they can earn from real investment, real investment declines and bribery 
becomes prevalent. Murphy et al. (1991), Lenway et al. (1996), Mauro (1995), and many others 
present empirical evidence supporting Krueger’s (1974) hypothesis.   
Solow (1957) showed that the greater part of economic growth is not due to growth in the 
quantity of capital or labor. He argued that this large, previously unexplained part economic 
growth, now called the Solow residual, must be due to ongoing innovation – the production of 
ever more valuable outputs from relatively less valuable inputs.  Solow’s finding is now regarded 
as the primary evidence supporting the thesis of Schumpeter (1934), later formalized by Romer 
(1986), that innovation is the main engine of economic growth.   
Innovation is a positive sum game.  Profit maximizing behavior by innovators creates 
new wealth, increasing the size of the economic pie and thus fueling long-term growth.  Rent 
seeking, in contrast, is a negative sum game.  Political rent seeking may be the highest return 
investment from the viewpoint of each individual or firm, but for society as a whole, it destroys 
value.  This is because the legislative favoritism, subsidies, and the like that are the rewards for 
successful rent seeking are not new wealth.  They are transfers from elsewhere in the economy.  
Collecting and redistributing these transfers is costly, and also introduces distortions and 
inefficiencies.   
Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) model how highly remunerative rent seeking diverts talent 
and resources away from real investment, and argue that this is highly detrimental to growth.  
They propose that, once talented individuals choose careers as either innovators or rent-seekers, 
they are locked into that career and steadily become more proficient at it.  This means that rent 19 
seeking and innovation both have path-dependent increasing returns to scale.
5  Economies 
characterized by widespread innovation become steadily better at it, and consequently grow ever 
more rapidly because innovation is a positive sum game.  Economies characterized by pervasive 
rent seeking become ever more encumbered by it, and consequently grow ever more slowly 
because rent seeking is a negative sum game.   
The proposition that oligarchic family control causes slow growth thus requires that 
oligarchic family control be associated with more rent-seeking, less innovation, or both.  
 
RENT-SEEKING AND THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA 
Political rent seeking can be thought of in terms of prisoner’s dilemma games, as 
modeled by Nash (1950, 1953).  Figure 2 illustrates the archetypal prisoner’s dilemma, where the 
police interrogate two prisoners separately.  The police have evidence to convict both prisoners 
of a minor crime, and suspect they committed a major crime.  The police propose a plea bargain 
to each prisoner. If the prisoner gives evidence against the other for the major crime, his sentence 
will be reduced from two years to one year.  They add that if the other gives evidence against 
him about the major crime, and he remains silent, he will be assumed to be solely responsible for 
it and will get twenty years.  But if both prisoners give evidence against each other, they will 
both be held responsible for the major crime and will both get fifteen years.   
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
If the prisoners can trust each other, both remain silent and both receive light sentences 
for the minor crime.  But if each is uncertain whether the other will keep faith, each gives 
evidence against the other.  Prisoner A knows that if prisoner B keeps faith, A is better off giving 
                                                 
5 See Morck, Sepanski and Yeung (2001) for empirical evidence of such path dependency in US corporate 
management.   20 
evidence against B to get a reduced sentence of one year, rather than two, for the minor crime.  
Prisoner A also knows that if B gives evidence against him, A is better off if he also gives 
evidence against B, and so gets fifteen years instead of twenty.   
In either case, A should provide evidence against B.  Going though the same logic, B 
likewise decides to provide evidence against B.  The resulting situation, where a lack of trust 
leads both parties to reach a sub-optimal situation of fifteen-year sentences, is called a non-
cooperative equilibrium.  Had the two prisoners trusted each other, they could have instead 
attained the cooperative equilibrium outcome of two-year sentences.   
Many economic transactions can be couched in such settings.  If a customer fears a 
supplier might use substandard materials, she avoids buying high value-added items where the 
potential damage would be worse.  If workers fear an employer might cheat them, they minimize 
the damage by shirking on the job.  If an inventor cannot trust a backer to pay him fairly for his 
innovation, he shuns backing, and his invention is not developed.  This reasoning is the basis of 
Fukuyama’s (1995) thesis that higher levels of general trust causes greater prosperity.   
Of course, cooperative behavior is not always desirable.  Producers ought not to 
cooperate with each other to sustain monopoly pricing.  Nor is the cooperation between 
politicians and corporate executives that characterizes so-called ‘crony capitalism’ desirable.   
Trade protectionism has also been shown to be an example of such reciprocal back scratching 
among top corporate executives and government officials - and labor leaders as well in many 
cases.  For example, Lenway et al. (1996) document the rent-seeking process whereby the United 
States government erected trade barriers against steel imports.  Using data the collect from 
Congressional Records, they show a statistical correlation of corporate lobbying activity with 
firm-specific benefits from subsequent trade barriers, as well as with subsequent CEO and senior 21 
worker pecuniary benefits.  Morck et al. (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2001), and Johnson and 
Mitton (2002) present empirical evidence that controls on capital inflow to business have been 
repeatedly also been used to direct financing towards politically favored firms by requiring, for 
example, local joint venture partners.
6  Although such capital flow policies have built strong 
family firms in many countries, their overall social costs and benefits are poorly understood at 
present.   
Political rent seeking can be though of as a prisoners dilemma game between the bribe-
paying business and the corrupt politician.  The politician could take a bribe and not deliver the 
promised favorable change in the law.  Or, the politician could provide a large subsidy and then 
not receive the expected kickback.  The bribe paying firm and the corrupt politician must be able 
to trust each other to fulfill the terms of their rent-seeking agreement.  Since such agreements are 
technically illegal in most countries, the courts cannot be used to punish defectors.  The 
cooperation must be based on personal credibility.   
Game theory sets specific conditions as to when cooperative outcomes are easier to 
attain.  These are: 
 
Genetically programmed cooperation  
  Cooperative behavior may be hard-wired into certain aspects of human behavior.  This 
seems to be true for interactions with close blood kin in many species, from social insects to 
humans.  Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) argue that cooperative behavior provides an evolutionary 
advantage.  Nonetheless, humans and ants both engage in lethal warfare.  Any genetically innate 
predisposition to cooperative behavior seems restricted to genetically close relatives, and does 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Leif Melin for bringing our attention to relevant examples in Thailand’s recent history, where 
protectionist legislation relating to ownership of capital by foreigners greatly advanced key local business families.  
See ‘Family Business in Thailand’, by Clayton Hebbard, in Families in Business 11(6) 17-20. 22 
not extend to all general members of the species.  Certainly, the strong preference family firms 
display for limiting the influence of outsiders is consistent with such a limitation.
7 
  Fisman (2001) shows that relatives of President Suharto controlled most major 
Indonesian firms in the mid 1990s.  Faccio (2002) shows that this is not an isolated case.  The 
senior corporate executives of important firms in many countries are blood relatives of senior 
government officials.  Consequently, the innate cooperation blood kin accord each other 
facilitates rent seeking.   
If the same oligarchic families that control the country’s great corporations are more 
prominent in its government, the cooperation necessary for rent-seeking is easier to achieve.   
 
Cooperation in repeated games  
In long repeated sequences of Prisoners’ Dilemma games, players can learn to cooperate.  
This is because one player can punish the other for defecting in one game by defecting in the 
next.  Axelrod (1984) shows that this policy of ‘tit-for-tat’ with occasional forgiveness generates 
superior overall payoffs in computer-generated prisoners’ dilemma repeated game tournaments 
against a wide range of alternate strategies.  Moreover, Axelrod (1987) shows that behavior 
closely resembling tit-for-tat emerges spontaneously in repeated sequences of Prisoners’ 
Dilemma games where survival into the next period depends on a player’s payoff this period and 
strategies are randomly modified each period by a genetic algorithm.  Cooperative behavior in 
repeated games, even if learned rather than innate, is a survival trait.  This logic underlies the 
need to establish long relationships with business partners in countries where cooperative 
behavior is not legally or ethically mandated.   
                                                 
7 For example, see ‘Family Firms Fret Over Role of Outsiders’, by Clayton Hebbard, The Nation, April 18, 2002  
 23 
The professional managers in charge of large publicly traded firms often have relatively 
brief careers at the top, having spent most of their lives rising through the corporate world.  In 
contrast, family controlled firms typically exhibit a more continuity of control, with the patriarch 
grooming the scion, sometimes for decades.   
Long-serving officials - the sort who can best do favors for firms - should find oligarchic 
family controlled firms more cooperative rent-seeking partners because of the higher likelihood 
of repeated games.   
 
Cooperation in small groups 
Olson (1965) shows that cooperative behavior is more readily sustained in repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma games with fewer players.  This is because detecting and punishing defection 
is easier if fewer players must be monitored and coordinated.  As the number of players grows 
very large, Olson shows that the non-cooperative outcome emerges with virtual certainty.   
La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Faccio and Lang (2001), Faccio et al. 
(2001), and others show that the most important corporations of most countries are organized 
into vast groups through pyramidal holding companies, cross holdings, multiple classes of stock, 
golden shares, and reserved board seats and that these groups are controlled by a small number 
of very wealthy families in each country.
8  As Morck et al. (2000) show, these control devices 
allow one company to control many others, each of which controls yet more companies.  These 
pyramidal structures can be more than a dozen layers high and can encompass hundreds of firms, 
many of which may be partly publicly owned, and all of which are controlled by a family firm at 
the pyramid’s apex.  La Porta et al. (1988) show that such pyramidal corporate group structures 
                                                 
8 See Barca and Becht (2000) for a description of these groups in Europe, Claessens et al. (2000) for East Asian 
family groups, and Morck et al. (2000) for Canadian family groups.  See Faccio and Lang (2001), Claessens et al. 
(2002), and Morck et al. (2000) for discussions of the behavior of such groups in different economies.   24 
include a large proportion of the largest firms in most countries.  The first row of Table 5 shows 
that countries with a high incidence of oligarchic family control also exhibit a high incidence of 
pyramidal holding companies.  Morck et al. (2000) show that a relatively small number of 
billionaire families control substantial fractions of the economies of many countries, presumably 
in this way.   
Insert Table 5 About Here 
This highly concentrated corporate control limits the number of potential rent-seeking 
players with which an official can deal, and so facilitates cooperation.   
 
Credible commitments to cooperate 
If the two parties can make binding promises to each other to act cooperatively, 
cooperative behavior can be achieved.  Fukuyama (1995) argues that this is the purpose of laws 
and cultures.  By subjecting themselves to certain punishment if they act in bad faith, and 
consequently break either social conventions or the law, the players in a prisoners’ dilemma can 
assure each other that they will act cooperatively.  Fukuyama further argues that some legal and 
ethical systems facilitate cooperative behavior with strangers, while others do not; and that 
broader cooperation induces more rapid economic growth.   
Established wealthy families controlling substantial assets can pay corrupt officials up 
front for subsequent favors.  Upstart firms, even ones with great potential, require political favors 
first but must promise kickbacks out of uncertain future revenues.  Moreover, since rent seeking 
is technically illegal in most countries, rent-seeking deals must be discrete.  As La Porta et al. 
(1998) show, the corporate groups controlled by the wealthiest families of most countries, 
typically include a mixture of public and private firms.  By using the revenues or assets of 25 
private group firms, wealthy families can provide a higher level of discretion to corrupt officials 
than other potential rent seekers can.   
Their established wealth and control over corporate assets, and their ability to act 
discretely, should make the principals of great family firms and groups more attractive rent 
seeking partners in the eyes of devious officials.   
 
Punishment for defection is harsh and certain 
If other players can readily detect and punish defectors, defection is both less profitable 
and less likely.  This is the case in games with a small number of players, but apparently can also 
explain some types of cooperation in large, anonymous groups.  For example, Axelrod (1986) 
shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained in games with many players if the players 
adopt strategies of punishing not only defectors, but also other players who fail to punish 
defectors.  Fehr and Gächter (2000) show in experiments with volunteers that people, if given the 
opportunity to do so, punish strangers who defect in prisoners’ dilemma games – even at 
considerable cost to themselves.  These experiments were done in developed countries, which 
Fukuyama (1995) argues have extended cooperative behavior to strangers.  It is not presently 
known whether these results can be replicated in low-income countries.  The fact that people in 
developing economies must spend years building relationships before business interactions are 
possible suggests that cooperative behavior is not expected in business dealings with strangers.  
It follows that punishment for non-cooperative behavior with strangers must be light or 
infrequent in these countries.   
Great families that control large firms or corporate groups are perhaps the only rival 
powers in many countries capable of punishing government officials for failing to keep a 26 
promise.  Their substantial existing wealth and control over a large fraction of the national 
economy make established wealthy families formidable disciplinarians of corrupt officials who 
fail to deliver.   
This ability to retaliate should make great mercantile families more willing to undertake 
rent-seeking deals with corrupt officials in the first place.   
 
Multiple points of contact 
The reinforcement that motivates cooperation can stem not just from repeated playing of 
the same game over time, but also from multiple simultaneous plays.  Oligarchic families, 
controlling dozens or hundreds of firms through pyramidal structures and the like, plausibly 
interact with important politicians and bureaucrats simultaneously in many different settings.  In 
analyzing the interactions between two diversified conglomerates, Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990) show that multimarket contacts reduce the incentive constraints that limit collusion.  If a 
similar effect takes place between officials and oligarchic families, this could explain a greater 
preponderance of rent-seeking collusion in economies dominated economically by a few great 
families.  The logic here is very similar to that underlying the repeated games and certainty of 
punishment arguments discussed above.  A politician who refuses to cooperate with an oligarchic 
family in one setting may find himself punished by a family operation in an entirely different 
sector of the economy.   
 
In summary, the most important partners of corrupt officials in rent-seeking deals are 
likely to be wealthy families that exercise long-term continuous control over very large groups of 
firms that comprise substantial fractions of national economies.   27 
Table 5 presents evidence consistent with political rent seeking being significantly more 
attractive in economies where the incidence of family control is higher.  Family firms are more 
important in countries where the taxation authorities, politicians, judges, and bureaucrats are all 
significantly more prone to corruption.  These differences are statistically significant, and 
perhaps the most critical one, that pertaining to bureaucratic corruption, remain highly significant 
after controlling for per capita income.   
 
OTHER PRISONERS’ DILEMMAS ASSOCIATED WITH RENT SEEKING 
Although the game between rent seeking firms and corrupt officials is at the heart of 
political rent seeking arrangements, other prisoners’ dilemmas fill in other important parts of the 
picture.   
First, the game between corrupt politicians and rent seeking firms is only possible if the 
rest of society permits it.  Those harmed by the cost of corruption and the dearth of real 
investment - taxpayers, consumers, and the like – could band together into an association, 
movement, or political party to expose and punish corrupt officials and corrupting firms.  But 
taxpayers and consumers are not blood kin, not usually engaged in repeated dealings with each 
other, numerous, unable to make credible commitments to keep faith, unable to identify and 
punish defectors, and largely unconnected with each other in other contexts.  This makes 
effective cooperation to thwart rent seeking difficult.   
Fukuyama (1995) argues that the higher level of trust that prevails in North America, 
northwestern Europe, and Japan allows people in those countries to form associations, 
organization, and grass-roots political movements that can curtail corruption among tax 
authorities, politicians, judges, and bureaucrats.  In contrast, countries with low levels of general 28 
trust cannot sustain such organizations, leaving governments and families the only enduring 
institutions, and rent seeking a highly profitable investment from the viewpoints of individual 
oligarchic families and corrupt officials.  Consistent with this, Faccio (2002) reports that firms 
invest more in political connections in countries with more corrupt institutions.   
Second, the interaction between the members of a great mercantile family also has 
aspects of a prisoner’s dilemma.  If a family member becomes estranged, he can damage the 
family by exposing its rent seeking deals.  Those privy to the family’s secrets must be able to 
trust each other to keep them secret.  Family firms occasionally disintegrate because of such 
infighting.  However, our genetic predisposition to cooperate with blood kin probably explains 
both the rarity of such defections and the high emotions such betrayals elicit in the affected 
families.   
Finally, the oligarchic families in a given country might cooperate, pledging to invest in 
innovation, rather than rent seeking.  This sort of cooperation could potentially leave all the 
families and officials better off.  However, Morck et al. (2000) report that economies more 
dominated by old family money exhibit statistically significantly lower private sector R&D 
spending and patent filings.  They also report that Canadian firms controlled by old families 
spend statistically significantly less on R&D than other comparable firms.  These findings can be 
explained in several ways.
9   
Schumpeter (1934) argues that the entrepreneurial talent needed to discover and develop 
innovations is scarce.  Moreover, entrepreneurial talent, like other dimensions of intelligence is, 
at most, only partially inherited.  Heirs several generations removed from the founder of the 
                                                 
9 Hall et al. (2001) distinguish entrepreneurial family firm cultures from non-entrepreneurial ones.  While specific 
family firms may indeed be entrepreneurial, the evidence in Morck et al. (2000) and Morck and Yeung (2002) 
suggests non-entrepreneurial cultures are more commonplace in the old-money family mercantile empires that are 
the focus of this study.   29 
family empire may have scant entrepreneurial talent.  This means efficient investment in 
innovation likely requires bringing in professional managers, and so threatens the oligarchic 
family’s control.  Given the advantages such families have in rent seeking, eschewing innovation 
and embracing rent seeking makes sense.  The oligarchic family both uses its comparative 
advantage and further entrenches itself in the sense of Shleifer and Vishny (1989) by locking in a 
corporate strategy that requires the family’s continued control.   
Olson (1963) shows, rapid growth is likely to have a destabilizing effect.  If wealthy, 
established families invest in innovation, and this increases the economy’s growth rate, they run 
the risk of destabilizing an economic order in which they currently have high positions.  Such 
considerations are likely to infuse established wealthy families with a conservative bias and a 
suspicion of innovation, as reported by Landes (1949).   
Morck and Yeung (2002) argue that creative destruction in economies whose large firms 
are mainly controlled by a few wealthy families would better be termed creative self-destruction.  
Creative destruction is the economic process of innovation described by Schumpeter (1934), 
whereby creative firms devise innovations and destroy moribund firms by depriving them of 
business.  In an economy of many independent firms, the destruction is visited upon old firms 
and does not enter the cost benefit analysis of the innovator.  In an economy where a few 
oligarchic families control most major corporations, one firm’s innovation may threaten the sales 
of another existing firm controlled by the same family.  This internalization of creative 
destruction lowers its overall return to the controlling family.  This can make innovation 
unattractive to the family even when it makes economic sense for the innovating firm and for the 30 
economy as a whole.
10  Consistent with this view, He et al. (2002) find that a higher turnover in 
the ranks of businesses is associated with faster economy-wide productivity growth.   
Schumpeter (1934) argues that innovation requires well-functioning financial markets 
and institutions, for innovators are generally not wealthy and require financial backing.   
Consistent with this, King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zinglaes (1998), Wurgler (2000), and 
Henry (2000) show that financial development is highly correlated with economic growth.   
Backing politicians and officials who would interfere with the efficient operations of the 
financial system is thus a particularly useful for of rent seeking, for this can prevent innovative 
new firms from rising to threaten established family businesses.  Rajan and Zingales (2001) 
argue that this is precisely what happened in many civil law countries during the twentieth 
century.  Morck et al. (2000) and Johnson and Mitton (2002) describe how dominant families 
prefer dysfunctional financial systems because these serve as barriers to entry – limiting 
competition from upstarts, and locking in the dominant positions of (their) established firms.   
In addition, Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2001), and others document systematic 
abuse of public shareholders by controlling families of corporate groups across a wide range of 
East Asian and European countries.
11  These families may merely prefer weak financial systems 
because stronger ones would restrict such behavior.  Undermining the financial system 
nonetheless impedes growth by preventing innovators from obtaining financial backing on 
efficient terms.   
 
                                                 
10 This situation can occur in any large firm.  For example, Betz (1997) documents how IBM top executives delayed 
that company’s efforts in PCs out of fear that PCs would marginalize the mainframe business that was their area of 
expertise.  We propose that such situations are more likely in economies where a few individuals or families control 
most major corporations.   
11 Actions by controlling shareholders that would qualify as abusive in the United States are often perfectly legal in 
these countries.  See la Porta et al. (1998) for a survey of these legal differences, and see Johnson et al. (2000) for 
the details of specific cases.     31 
A LOW INCOME – LOW TRUST TRAP? 
The considerations discussed in the previous sections suggest the possibility of 
destructive self-reinforcing feedback between oligarchic family control, rent seeking, and 
poverty.   
The wealthy established families that economically dominate many countries are active 
and adept rent seekers.  They fear innovation because it might erode their dominance, and they 
use their rent seeking skills to block the entry of innovators by undermining the financial system.  
Once such political rent-seeking deals are routine, neither individual wealthy families nor 
individual officials benefit by curtailing them.  The result is that an economy dominated by 
political rent seeking and locked into poverty.   
Although Table 3 did not show a strong link between family control and measures of 
trust.  Nonetheless, this self-serving behavior and widespread political corruption might erode 
trust for non-kin among the population in general.  This lack of trust might then be one factor 
preventing ordinary people from coalescing into political parties and other organizations that 
might check corruption and the power of the established families.  However, Table 3 clearly 
indicates that other facets must predominate.   
 
SOME CAVEATS 
The empirical evidence we have presented, both in the tables and in the other studies 
discussed above, is consistent with this mutually reinforcing model of low trust economies.   
However, it does not prove the case.  This is because correlations do not necessarily imply causal 
relationships.  Low income might ‘cause’ oligarchic family domination, widespread rent-
seeking, and a dysfunctional financial sector, leaving no causal relationship per se between 32 
family domination and rent-seeking or between family domination and a dysfunctional financial 
sector.   
The most unambiguous tests of causality are ‘event studies’, where one of the variables 
of interest changes for exogenous reasons.  The resultant changes in the other variables then 
allow clear inferences about what causes what.  Unfortunately, we have only a single year cross-
section measuring the incidence of family control, so such techniques are beyond the scope of 
the current study.  Causality can also sometimes be inferred from instrumental variables 
techniques, however no econometrically useful instruments are available.  For example, using 
lagged independent variables as instruments is questionable because all of our variables change 
slowly over time.  Per capita GDP in 1970 is highly correlated with 1994 per capita GDP.  If 
they were available, measures of corruption and family dominance in the two years would also 
be highly correlated through time.  In such a setting, instrumental variables techniques can 
produce misleading inferences of causality.   
However, our purpose is not to unravel what is, in any case, a very complicated web of 
causality.  Rather, we wish to highlight how the mechanisms discussed above reinforce each 
other to create a low-income trap, which we believe limits the standards of living of the peoples 
of many countries.  An effective trap can be constructed in many ways.   
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
By some measures, the gap in per capita income between richer and poorer nations is 
wider than ever.  We propose that a failure to appreciate the economic implications of oligarchic 
family corporate groups may be at least partly responsible.   33 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have come to appreciate the 
importance of corruption in perpetuating poverty.  This is the primary motivation for the current 
emphasis these institutions place on structural reform, which has become an abbreviation for 
cleaning up corruption of all sorts.  The self-reinforcing nature of the low-income trap we 
describe suggests that ending corruption may be a hopeless task if a small number of oligarchic 
families continue to control most business interests in poor countries.   
Equally, displacing the existing elite, as sometimes happens after abrupt shifts in political 
regimes, and as Olsen (1982) recommends, is also unlikely to bring about real change unless the 
relative return to rent seeking is also lowered.  After such a disruption, new leading families with 
political connections should quickly take the place of those who were ejected.   
Ultimately, what is required is a joint attack on both.  Pressure to end official corruption 
should be accompanied by pressure to replace entrenched family firms with professionally 
managed ones.  Since the economic dominance of a corrupt oligarchy of great mercantile 
families is likely to inspire a general lack of trust in a country’s institutions, establishing a high 
level of trust, as advocated by Fukuyama (1995, 1995a) probably requires breaking this self-
reinforcing cycle of corruption and oligarchic control.  Moreover, a (realistic) high level of trust 
makes professional management possible by allowing public equity markets to develop.   34 
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Figure 1 
 
Measuring Inequality 
 
Inequality is measured by the gini coefficient, the area between a country’s actual income 
distribution and a perfect equality income distribution, represented by the forty-five degree line.  
The larger the are between the two functions, the greater the income inequality.  
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Figure 2 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The police have solid evidence that two miscreants are guilty of a minor crime, and suspect that 
they are also guilty of a major crime.  Keeping the two prisoners separate, they explain to each 
that, if he gives evidence against the other for the major crime, his sentence will be reduced from 
two years to one year.  They add that if the other gives evidence against him about the major 
crime, and he remains silent, he will be assumed solely responsible for it and will get twenty 
years.  But if both prisoners give evidence against each other, they will both be held responsible 
for the major crime and will both get fifteen years.  Prisoner A knows that if prisoner B keeps faith, 
A is better off giving evidence against B to get a reduced sentence of one year, rather than two, 
for the minor crime.  Prisoner A also knows that if B gives evidence against him, A is better off if 
he also gives evidence against B, and so gets fifteen years instead of twenty.  In either case, A 
should provide evidence against B.  The same logic leads B to provide evidence against B.  This 
situation, where a lack of trust leads to a sub-optimal situation of fifteen-year sentences, is called 
a non-cooperative equilibrium.  Had the two prisoners trusted each other, they could have instead 
attained the cooperative equilibrium outcome of two-year sentences.   
 
    B’s decision 
    keep faith  defect 
 
keep faith 
 
P(A) =  -2 
P(B) =  -2 
 
P(A) = -20 
P(B) =   -1 
 
 
 
A’s decision 
 
defect 
 
P(A) =   -1 
P(B) = -20 
 
P(A) = -15 
P(B) = -15 
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Table 1 
 
The Incidence of Family Control in Different Countries 
 
Family control is inferred if the largest shareholder is a family and if its stake is greater than either 
a 20% or 10% voting-control threshold.  Family control is assigned to the twenty largest publicly 
traded firms, ranked by December 1995 market capitalization, in each country; and for ten 
randomly chosen medium sized firms, with market capitalization greater than $500 million in 
December 1995. 
 
     
Twenty Largest 
Firms     Ten Middle-size 
Firms    
           
   Country 
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold   
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold   
   Argentina  65%  65%     80%  80%    
   Australia  5%  10%     50%  50%    
   Austria  15%  15%     17%  17%    
   Belgium  50%  50%     40%  40%    
   Canada  25%  30%     30%  50%    
   Denmark  35%  35%     40%  40%    
   Finland  10%  10%     20%  20%    
   France  20%  20%     50%  50%    
   Germany  10%  10%     40%  40%    
   Greece  50%  65%     100%  100%    
   Hong Kong  70%  70%     90%  90%    
   Ireland  10%  15%     13%  25%    
   Israel  50%  50%     60%  60%    
   Italy  15%  20%     60%  80%    
   Japan  5%  10%     10%  10%    
   Mexico  100%  100%     100%  100%    
   Netherlands  20%  20%     20%  20%    
   New Zealand  25%  45%     29%  86%    
   Norway  25%  25%     40%  40%    
   Portugal  45%  50%     50%  50%    
   Singapore  30%  45%     40%  60%    
   South Korea  20%  35%     50%  80%    
   Spain  15%  25%     30%  30%    
   Sweden  45%  55%     60%  60%    
   Switzerland  30%  40%     50%  50%    
   United Kingdom  0%  5%     40%  60%    
   United States  20%  20%     10%  30%    
  
 Source:  La Porta et al.  (1999).   
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Table 2 
 
Economy Characteristics and the Incidence of Family Control 
  
Simple Correlation Coefficients    
   Twenty Largest Firms   Ten Middle-size Firms 
    
  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold 
10% 
Threshold  sample
Economic Development                  
-0.514  -0.577    -0.560  -0.564  27  Logarithm of 1995 per capita GDP in current 
international dollars at PPP  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
Physical Infrastructure                  
-0.354  -0.398    -0.553  -0.480  25  Average scores for roads, air, ports, telecom, & 
power for how well each meets business needs  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.02)   
Health Care                  
0.757  0.749    0.653  0.665  25  Logarithm of infant mortality rate per 1,000, 1993 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
Human Development                  
-0.439  -0.422    -0.551  -0.519  25  Percent of respondents who agreed that the 
education system meets the needs of a competitive 
economy  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.01)    
Macroeconomic Policy                  
0.709  0.699    0.689  0.602  25  Average monthly inflation, 1990-2002 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
Equality           
0.547  0.541    0.504  0.491  27 
Income inequality as measured by a Gini coefficient 
(0.00)  (0.00)    (0.01)  (0.01)    
Numbers in parenthesis are probability levels for the null hypothesis of zero correlation or zero regression 
coefficient. Incidence of control is as of 1995.   45 
Table 3 
 
Measures of Trust and the Incidence of Family Control 
  
Simple Correlation Coefficients    
   Incidence of Family Control in 1995 in    
   Twenty Largest Firms   Ten Middle-size Firms    
       
  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold Sample
-0.234  -0.243    -0.359  -0.332  21  Survey results of the extent to 
which people trust strangers  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.11)  (0.14)    
-0.015  0.043    -0.037  0.106  20  Survey results for how much 
people trust their families  (0.95)  (0.86)  (0.88)  (0.66)    
-0.278  -0.276    -0.337  -0.216  21  The incidence of membership 
in professional associations  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.14)  (0.35)    
-0.140  -0.182    -0.326  -0.273  21  Index of the extent of civic 
participation  (0.54)  (0.43)  (0.15)  (0.23)    
Numbers in parenthesis are probability levels for the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation or zero regression coefficient.  
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Table 4 
 
Economy Characteristics and the Incidence of Family Firms, Controlling for Per 
Capita Income 
   Regression coefficient                  
of 1995 family control variable      
   Twenty Largest Firms   Ten Middle-size Firms  
      
  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold 
10% 
Threshold    sample
Economic Development                    
-2.37  -2.57    -3.31  -3.10    27  Growth in real per capita GDP, 1990 to 2000 
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.02)      
Physical Infrastructure                    
0.398  0.431  -0.340  -0.055    25  Average scores for roads, air, ports, telecom, & 
power for how well each meets business needs  (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (0.91)   
Health Care                    
0.879  0.802  0.454  0.491    25  Logarithm of infant mortality rate per 1,000, 1993 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.14)  (0.09)      
Human Development                    
-0.811  -0.681  -1.26  -1.05    25  Percent of respondents who agreed that the 
education system meets the needs of a competitive 
economy  (0.26)  (0.37)  (0.07)  (0.10)     
Macroeconomic Policy                    
0.00483  0.00443  0.00399  0.00266    25  Average monthly inflation, 1990-2002 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.09)    
Equality                    
13.6  14.1  11.5  10.9    27  Income inequality as measured by a Gini coefficient 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)      
Numbers in parenthesis are probability levels for the null hypothesis of zero correlation or zero regression 
coefficient. Regressions are of the form  
   economy characteristic = a + b x family control incidence + c x logarithm of 1995 per capita  GDP + e.   
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Table 5 
 
Measures of the Return to Political Rent Seeking and the Incidence of Family Firms 
  Simple Correlation Coefficients    
Regression Coefficients                
controlling for log of 1995 per capita GDP     
   Incidence of Family Control in 1995 in     Incidence of Family Control in 1995 in      
   Twenty Largest Firms   Ten Middle-size Firms   Twenty Largest Firms Ten Middle-size Firms    
              
  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold    
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold   Sample
Control Concentration                       
0.313      0.357  0.108  0.157    0.418  0.529  0.079  0.154    27  Incidence of pyramidal holding company 
structures  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.59)  (0.43)     (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.77)  (0.56)     
Tax System Corruption                                     
-0.470  -0.444    -0.472  -0.270     -0.889  -0.588  -0.732  0.470    25  Higher scores indicate general 
compliance with tax laws  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.19)    (0.32)  (0.54)  (0.40)  (0.57)      
Political System Corruption                                
-0.414  -0.438    -0.526  -0.523     0.367  0.188  -1.05  -0.980    27  Higher scores indicate a general absence 
of official corruption  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01)    (0.73)  (0.87)  (0.31)  (0.33)      
Judicial System Corruption                                
-0.340  -0.375    -0.457  -0.426     0.501  -0.691  0.292  -0.036    27  The efficiency and integrity of the judicial 
system, particularly as it affects business  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.03)    (0.56)  (0.55)  (0.78)  (0.97)      
Civil Service Corruption                                     
-0.663  -0.685    -0.722  -0.630     -2.64  -2.59  -2.83  -1.82    27  High scores indicate bureaucrats have 
"autonomy" and the “strength and 
expertise to govern” 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.07) 
    
Regulatory Barriers to Entry                       
0.521  0.501  0.578  0.424    0.195  0.160  0.218  0.080    27  Estimated regulatory compliance cost of 
starting a new business, as % of GDP  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)    (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.06)  (0.50)     
Numbers in parenthesis are probability levels for the null hypothesis of zero correlation or zero regression coefficient.  Regressions are of the form 
rent-seeking measure = a + b x family control incidence + c x the logarithm of 1995 per capita GDP + e.   
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